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CAPITAL LOSSES: FALLING SHORT ON FAIRNESS 
AND SIMPLICITY 
Fred W. Peel, Jr.t 
INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Reform Act of 19861 ("TRA '86") struck a major blow for 
horizontal equity in the federal income tax system by equalizing tax rates 
between capital gains and ordinary income. In the process, TRA '86 
greatly simplified the understanding, computation, and administration of 
tax treatment of capital gains and of capital loss carryovers. TRA '86 
failed, however, to apply the principle of horizontal equity to net capital 
losses. Consequently, an unnecessary residue of complexity in the treat-
ment of capital losses remains. 
Fully effective in 1988, the capital gain and loss changes made by 
TRA '86 simplify the treatment of capital gains and losses chiefly in two 
respects. First, there is no tax rate differential between capital gains and 
other income for either individuals2 or corporations.3 Second, there is no 
practical distinction between long-term and short-term capital gains and 
between long-term and short-term capitallosses.4 
With respect to treatment of capital losses, TRA '86 distinguished 
between individual and corporate taxpayers, but allowed neither to de-
duct net capital losses in full. For individuals the treatment of capital 
losses was simplified and liberalized to some extent. An excess of capital 
losses over capital gains may be applied dollar for dollar against ordinary 
income up to a maximum each year of $3,000.5 For corporations the 
treatment of capital losses was not changed. They are allowed in full 
against capital gains, but may not be applied against ordinary income. 6 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FULL CAPITAL LOSS ALLOWANCE 
Fair treatment of capital gain and loss requires that each be treated 
the same as ordinary income and loss, respectively, because the economic 
benefit from a dollar of capital gain is the same as the economic benefit 
from a dollar of ordinary income, and a dollar of capital loss has the 
same economic effect as a dollar of ordinary loss.7 There is no intrinsic 
t B.A., 1939, Harvard College; LL.B., 1942, Harvard Law School; Professor Emeri-
tus, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. 
1. Tax Refonn Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
2. I.R.C. § 10) (West Supp. 1988). 
3. Id. § 1201 (a). 
4. But see id. §§ 584(c)(1),(2) (relating to common trust funds), 1212 (loss carrybacks 
and carryforwards), 1222-23 (definitions and holding period rules), 1233 (short 
sales). 
5. Id. § 1211(b). 
6. Id. § 1211(a). 
7. See generally D. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 5 (rev. 2d ed. 
1984) (setting forth proposal that adopts an "integration concept," whereby capital 
gains realized upon sale or exchange of assets are taxed fully after allowing a step-up 
1988] Capital Losses 419 
difference between capital assets and other assets that justifies special 
treatment for either capital gains or capital losses. Taxpayers invest in 
capital assets to profit from their use or their eventual disposition. Such 
assets may yield current income through rents, royalties, dividends, or 
interest. Even those assets held for personal use - homes, pleasure 
boats, etc. - yield imputed income to their owners. Capital assets held 
for eventual profit through sale at a gain really are being held for sale 
even though they escape the narrower classification of inventory or prop-
erty held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or busi-
ness. 8 The thinness of the distinction between capital assets and business 
assets is demonstrated by the anomalous treatment in section 1231 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") of depreciable assets and land used 
in a trade or business.9 
Unlimited allowance of capital losses may be justified in theory even 
when net capital gains are given favorable tax treatment. lO Certainly, 
theoretical justification exists for unlimited allowance of capital losses 
when capital gains are fully taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. It 
is no longer possible to defend restrictions on the allowance of capital 
losses by arguing that such treatment is justified because it is parallel to 
the treatment given capital gains. 11 
The parallel treatment argument was specious from its outset except 
in the case of gains and losses realized by the same taxpayer. Restriction 
of one taxpayer's use of an economic loss cannot be justified by pointing 
to another taxpayer's benefit from special treatment of capital gains. An 
extreme example is the unfortunate individual who has one large capital 
loss in a lifetime and no present or foreseeable capital gains. Even if this 
taxpayer should live long enough to recoup the loss through small annual 
deductions of the unused capital loss carryforward each year,12 such re-
coupment will not accurately reflect the current cost of the initial loss to 
the taxpayer. 
Deduction of capital losses has not always been restricted, even 
when capital gains were given favored tax treatment. Deduction of capi-
tal losses was allowed in full from the Revenue Act of 191813 until the 
Revenue Act of 1924,14 though capital gains were initially accorded fa-
vored treatment under the Revenue Act of 1921. 15 
in basis for price level rises and realized capital losses are fully deductible against 
ordinary income). 
8. See I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1982) (inventory exception to definition of "capital asset"). 
9. See infra text following note 55. 
10. See Warren, The Deductibility by Individuals of Capital Losses under the Federal 
Income Tax, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 291, 295 (1973). 
11. The parallel treatment argument was used by the Committee on Ways and Means in 
its Report on the Revenue Act of 1924. See H.R. REp. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 57 (1924). 
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. . 
13. Revenue Act of 1918, Ch. 18, § 214(a)(5), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067 (1919). 
14. Revenue Act of 1924, Ch. 234, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 253, 263. 
15. Revenue Act of 1921, Ch. 136, §§ 206, 214(a)(5), 42 Stat. 227, 232-33, 240. 
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WHY CONGRESS DID NOT GO ALL THE WAY 
In 1986 Congress made relatively minor changes for individuals in 
the application of capital losses against ordinary income and in the appli-
cation of unused capital loss carryovers. 16 For the most part, Congress 
left intact the elaborate machinery for defining capital assets, for distin-
guishing short-term from long-term capital gains and losses,17 and for 
computing capital gain or ordinary loss on business assets in section 
1231.18 Congress also retained an array of other provisions that, because 
of the extinct tax rate differential between capital gains and ordinary in-
come, have virtually no justification in policy. 19 
Congress had several reasons for its decision not to eliminate the 
elaborate capital gain and loss and section 1231 machinery which would 
have simplified the Code. First, Congress intended to provide a token of 
the sincerity of its promise that if ordinary income tax rates should be 
increased above the levels set in TRA '86, the capital gain tax rate would 
not be increased.20 Congress provided this token by establishing a maxi-
mum capital gain tax rate of28% (plus the 5% notch rate where applica-
ble).21 For corporations, Congress established an alternative tax on 
capital gains with a maximum rate of 34% (Plus the 5% notch rate 
where applicable), applicable if the corporate ordinary income tax rate is 
higher.22 Neither of these provisions are operative after 1987, because 
the marginal ordinary income tax rate for individuals would not exceed 
28% (plus the notch rate), and the corporate ordinary income tax rate 
would not exceed 34% (Plus the notch rate). 
Congress could just as well have included its promise (i.e., not to 
raise the tax rate on capital gains if the rate is raised on other types of 
income) in the Conference Committee Report instead of the Code. Such 
a promise written into the Code is no more binding on the next Congress 
than are the provisions setting the individual and corporate tax rates on 
ordinary income. Perhaps the drafters could have achieved simplifica-
tion by suspending the capital gain and loss and section 1231 machinery, 
separating it from the operative Code provisions, so that a later Congress 
could implement it if and when an increase of ordinary income tax rates 
without an increase in capital gain tax rates was considered desirable. 
A second reason for retaining the capital gain and loss and section 
1231 machinery in the Code was the particular importance of such reten-
tion for industries covered by section 631 - timber and coal and iron ore 
16. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2217 (1986). 
17. I.R.C. § 1222 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
18. Id. § 1231. 
19. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. 
20. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 20 SESS. 11-106 (Comm. 
Print 1987); GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. 
CoNF. REP. No. 841, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-106 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4194. 
21. I.R.C. § 10) (West Supp. 1988). 
22. Id. § 1201(a). 
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leasing - that had capital gain treatment (via section 1231) by fiat either 
for items that otherwise would not meet the definition of capital assets or 
for transactions that would not meet the definition of sales or ex-
changes.23 If section 631 were eliminated along with the capital gain and 
loss and section 1231 provisions, and if Congress later decided to reestab-
lish favored tax treatment for capital gains, these industries might have 
to convince Congress again of the validity of their cases for capital gain 
treatment. 
One reason for retaining the cumbersome machinery in the Code 
may have been simply lack of time. Prior to the conference agreement, 
the House version of the 1986 bill eliminated the alternative tax on capi-
tal gains for corporations, but retained the deduction for individuals of a 
percentage of net long-term capital gains.24 The Senate version of the 
bill, on the other hand, retained the alternative tax for corporations but 
eliminated the special capital gain deduction for individuals.25 It was not 
until the conferees agreed to equalize capital gain and ordinary income 
tax rates both for corporations and for individuals that it became poss~ble 
to eliminate provisions in the Code that applied to both types of taxpay-
ers. Although lack of time perhaps excused failure to complete the eradi-
cation in 1986, this is not an acceptable long-term excuse. 
A substantive reason for retaining at least part of the capital gain 
and loss structure after the tax rate differences were removed was a fear 
that taxpayers would take undue advantage of an opportunity to realize 
capital losses to offset ordinary income while not realizing their capital 
gains. 
THE CHERRY-PICKING PROBLEM 
The fundamental difference between most types of ordinary income 
and most capital gains and losses is that the taxpayer usually controls the 
timing of realization of capital gains and losses. Taxpayers have a similar 
degree of control over the timing of realization of income or loss on land 
used in a trade or business. Requirements of consistency in cost recov-
ery26 restrict taxpayer control of timing of realization with respect to 
depreciable assets prior to disposition, but taxpayers can control the tim-
ing of the disposition itself and, thus, final realization of gain or loss. 
Taxpayer control over realization of capital losses has generated fear 
that the allowance of capital losses to offset ordinary income without 
limitation will prompt taxpayers to let their potential gains accumulate 
without realization while realizing their capital losses to avoid taxes on 
ordinary income. In the jargon of tax policy theorists and tax specialists, 
this is "cherry-picking." 
23. Id. § 631. 
24. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 233 (1985). 
25. S. REp. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986). 
26. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (West Supp. 1988). 
422 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
Cherry-picking certainly will occur to some degree if capital losses 
are allowed without limitation. It occurred in a more sophisticated and 
lucrative context with losses on section 1231 assets before enactment of 
the five-year lookback provision in 1984.27 The five-year lookback re-
quires ordinary income treatment of section 1231 net gain for a year to 
the extent that section 1231 net losses for the previous five years have not 
already been used to offset other section 1231 gains. Straightforward 
cherry-picking of section 1231 assets to realize ordinary loss has not up-
set tax policymakers in the same way that the potential for cherry-pick-
ing of capital losses has. 
Cherry-picking really is not an outrageous tax avoidance practice. 
It involves taking into account for tax purposes admitted economic losses 
that the taxpayer has suffered. If some tax losses do not reflect genuine 
economic loss (as with loss realized on the sale of property after a date-
of-death basis step-up), legislation dealing with the specific abuse is more 
appropriate than denial of tax relief for all capital losses. 
THE STEP-UP IN BASIS STUMBLING BLOCK 
Unlimited allowance of capital losses cannot be justified so long as 
the present tax-free step-up in basis of appreciated assets at death re-
mains in effect.28 If unlimited capital losses are combined with the step-
up in basis at death, the taxpayer who has both capital gains and capital 
losses can realize the losses to offset other income and let the gains accu-
mulate unrealized until death, so that the gains escape income tax 
altogether. 
One attempted solution to the problem created by the disposition of 
property at death was the 1976 provision for a carryover of the dece-
dent's basis.29 The opposition that led to the demise30 of this carryover 
basis approach stemmed from two sources. First, taxpayers and tax 
planners had simply grown accustomed to escaping tax by holding appre-
ciated property until death and were unwilling to give up the advantage. 
Second, there were sincere fears of the potential liability imposed on ex-
ecutors for failing to compute carryover basis correctly and for failing to 
allocate high and low basis assets fairly among distributees. These fears 
prompted opposition by the American Bar Association to the carryover 
basis provision.3l The 1976 carryover basis provision was further ham-
pered by the complexity of transitional rules that, ironically, were moti-
vated by a desire to impose the change with the least possible dislocation. 
27. I.R.C. § 1231(c) (Supp. II 1984 & West Supp. 1988), added by Tax Refonn Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 176(a), 98 Stat. 494, 709. 
28. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1982). 
29. I.R.C. § 1023 (1982), added by Tax Refonn Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455 
§ 2005(a), 90 Stat. 1784, 1872. 
30. Section 1023 ofthe Code was repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-223 § 40 1 (a), 94 Stat. 299 
(1980). 
31. 65 A.B.A.J. 304, 341 (1979). 
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A simpler solution would be to treat death as a realization event for 
the decedent. 32 Transfer of property at death appears to be an appropri-
ate occasion for recognition of income (or loss) to the decedent, because 
such time is optimal for closing all deferred accounts of the decedent. 
An exception should be made for transfers to a surviving spouse, which 
exception would be consistent with the treatment of such transfers by 
estate and gift tax provisions. Basis should carry over in that case, how-
ever, as it does in the case of an interspousal gift made during the donor's 
life. 
Conceivably, transfer by gift also could be an occasion for realizing 
gain or loss, but carryover basis has worked reasonably well in the case of 
gifts. In any event, treating a gift as a realization need not be a prerequi-
site to consistent treatment of capital gains and losses. 
MARK-TO-MARKET PROPOSALS 
Some opposition toward allowing the taxpayer to time his realiza-
tion of capital losses to offset other income probably stems from a belief 
that unrealized gains and losses should be taken into account annually. 
Such belief is part of the Haig-Simons definition of the ideal income tax 
base.33 This definition has been accepted as the ideal with a surprising 
lack of critical analysis. One critic who does recognize the impracticality 
of its general application has noted that, logically, the second best tax 
system is not necessarily the system that comes closest to the Haig-
Simons definition.34 Nevertheless, Haig-Simons as the ideal has received 
more acceptance than it deserves.35 
Market value of property is determined by either current yield or 
anticipated demand or a combination of these two factors. The current 
yield itself is taxed presently.36 To the extent that the value of property 
is determined by current yield, taxatic.n of both current yield and accre-
tion in value of the underlying asset that is a reflection of the yield would 
be unfair. Except in the case of collectors' items, to the extent that an 
asset's appreciation in value has not been accompanied by a commensu-
32. Hickman, Capital Gains and Simplification, Federal Income Tax Simplification 
(ALI-ABA) 223, 239 (1979). 
33. "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of 
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of prop-
erty rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." H.C. SIMONS, 
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). 
34. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 925, 983 (1967). 
35. See, e.g., D.F. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 5 (rev. 2d ed. 
1984) ("Under the broadest concept of an income tax base, capital gains that repre-
sent an increase in real wealth would be taxed even though not realized by sale or 
exchange of the asset. Similarly, capital losses, whether realized or not, would be 
subtracted in full from all sources of income in computing the tax base.") 
36. Municipal bond interest is one legislative exception. 1.R.c. § 75 (1982 & West 
Supp. 1988). 
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rate current yield, the owner of the asset has received no benefit beyond a 
feeling of satisfaction at having made a shrewd investment. 
An unrealized gain unaccompanied by current benefit is, in common 
terminology, a "paper profit." Entirely aside from the administrative 
problems of annual valuation involved in applying the Haig-Simons defi-
nition, the principal problem with such definition is the absence of any 
benefit to the owner that justifies the imposition of an income tax on an 
unrealized accretion in value. Thus, the theoretical basis for this compo-
nent of the Haig-Simons definition of income is at least questionable. 
Some commentators have proposed taking into account in the tax 
base appreciation or depreciation in market value of investment assets 
that have easily ascertainable market values.37 This concept, called 
"mark-to-market," was initially advanced in pursuit of the Haig-Simons 
ideal.38 Since the enactment of TRA '86, however, the use of mark-to-
market for a limited category of assets has been proposed as one way of 
reducing the potential for cherry-picking sufficiently to permit unlimited 
allowance of capital losses. 39 The proposal is to mark property to market 
if it is "marketable," a characteristic of stocks and bonds listed on stock 
exchanges or publicly traded in the over-the-counter market.40 Publicly 
traded stocks and bonds may include those issued by corporations or 
partnerships already identified by registration under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, as amended.41 
The limited mark-to-market proposals are flawed in several respects. 
First, as discussed earlier, taxation of unrealized appreciation under the 
Haig-Simons definition of income is of questionable validity. 
Second, the imposition of a tax on unrealized appreciation and the 
limitation of such imposition to a designated type of investment asset 
would create a serious bias in capital markets. The bias against stock of 
publicly held corporations would be particularly acute. Because of the 
double taxation of dividend income, such stock is already under a tax 
handicap compared with debt obligations, stock of S corporations, stock 
of closely held C corporations that do not declare significant dividends, 
and interests in partnerships that are not taxed as corporations. Singling 
out investment in publicly held corporations for mark-to-market treat-
ment would undermine the United States securities market. 
Third, taxation of unrealized appreciation in securities would put 
37. See Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 
76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967) [hereinafter Slawson]; Note, Realizing Appreciation With-
out Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STANFORD 
L. REV. 857 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale). 
38. Note, Appreciation Without Sale, supra note 37, at 858. 
39. Ginsburg, Canellos, Levin, Eustice, Reexamining Subchapter C: An Overview and 
Some Modest Proposals to Stimulate Debate, INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUB-
CHAPTER C 3, 6 (1987). 
4O.Id. 
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 892 § 12, codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
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the taxpayer in a position of having to liquidate a substantial portion of 
his investment in order to pay the tax. This forced liquidation would 
create an unfair hardship and would have an artificial, adverse effect on 
the market price of the securities. This prospect alone would deter 
closely held expanding companies from making public offerings of their 
stock. A hypothetical illustration is the case of one individual who owns 
all the outstanding stock of a corporation - one million shares with a 
basis of $1 per share. The corporation has bright prospects, and a public 
offering by the corporation of an additional one million shares could 
yield $10 per share. If the effect of the public offering is to bring the 
stock under a mark-to-market regimen, the market value of $10,000,000 
for the original shareholder's stock would produce a $9,000,000 taxable 
gain based on the unrealized appreciation of his stock. At a 28% tax 
rate, the cost in taxes of the corporation's public offering to such an indi-
vidual would be over $2,500,000. 
Finally, the mark-to-market concept might be unconstitutional. In 
Eisner v. Macomber,42 the Supreme Court assumed that realization was 
necessary for a constitutional tax on income.43 The precedent is old, per-
haps even obsolete. In TRA '86, Congress adopted a mark-to-market 
method of dealing with a special abuse situation: the taxation of futures 
.contracts held by the taxpayer at the close of the taxable year.44 The 
courts could uphold mark-to-market in these limited circumstances as 
constitutional. They could nevertheless decide under Eisner that, be-
cause unrealized appreciation is not income and thus is not encompassed 
by the sixteenth amendment, so that a tax imposed on broad-based mark-
to-market is a direct tax that requires apportionment.4s 
THE REVENUE COST OF FAIRNESS 
How serious would the revenue loss be if capital losses were allowed 
in full? Losses on section 1231 assets already qualify under the tax sys-
tem for ordinary loss treatment if they exceed gains on section 1231 as-
sets.46 If retention of appreciated assets until death were no longer to be 
rewarded by tax-free step-up in basis to market value, a major induce-
ment to realize losses and to allow gains to accumulate unrealized would 
be eliminated. The revenue gain from taxation of unrealized gain at 
death might exceed the revenue cost of unlimited allowance of capital 
losses. 
In a period of prosperity and generally rising price levels, the vol-
ume of capital losses is not likely to be large. Even though prosperity 
periodically fades and the Dow Jones average drops occasionally, experi-
42. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
43. See id. at 213-15. See also He\vering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 
(1934) (dictum). 
, 44. I.R.C. § 1256 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
45. U.S. CONST. art: I, § 9, cl. 4. 
46. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988). 
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ence for the past half-century indicates that stock price levels will con-
tinue to rise. The trend toward higher and higher stock prices is not a 
function of prosperity or of "inflation" in a strict sense. Instead, it ap-
pears to be the result of institutional factors that override fluctuations in 
the level of utilization of productive capacity. When the level of eco-
nomic activity drops as prices continue to rise, "stagflation" is said to 
occur.47 Whatever the name, the prospect of rising price levels should 
minimize concern about the revenue cost of allowing capital losses in 
full. 
If cherry-picking by investors who, with capital gains as well as 
losses, might take the losses against other income and let the gains accu-
mulate unrealized is perceived as a serious revenue loss threat, there is a 
way to alleviate such threat. Taxpayers who derive immediate economic 
benefit from the appreciation in their capital assets by borrowing against 
them while realizing net capital losses can be required to include in in-
come (with appropriate basis adjustments) the excess of their loan pro-
ceeds over the basis of their assets mortgaged or pledged to secure the 
loans.48 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE CAPITAL LOSS RESTRICTIONS 
Code provisions that were enacted originally to deny capital gain 
benefits to certain types of gains survive after TRA '86 only to prevent 
taxpayers from offsetting capital losses against these gains. These provi-
sions affect a significant number of taxpayers and tend to be complex and 
difficult to administer. 
One example is section 341, which denies capital gain treatment to 
gain on the sale, exchange, or liquidation of so-called collapsible corpora-
tions. This provision now exists largely as a trap for those who mistak-
enly assume that section 341 no longer applies now that capital gains are 
taxed at ordinary income tax rates. The provision still applies, however, 
to preclude gain on collapsible corporation stock from being offset by 
capital losses. If Congress previously intended that section 341 treat 
shareholder gain as ordinary income and enforce a double tax on value 
increases generated at the corporate level, repeal of the General Utilities 
doctrine49 in 1986 has assured a tax on appreciation of corporate assets at 
the corporate level in a taxable liquidation. 50 
Four provisions in subchapter K, which deal with partnerships, now 
operate only to preclude use of capital losses to offset gains arising from 
47. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 825 (9th ed. 1973). 
48. Cj. Tax Treatment of Real Estate, 1977: Panel Discussions on the Subject of General 
Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 507, 
526 (statement of Adrian W. DeWind), 571 (statement of Jerome Kurtz) (1973) 
(making similar suggestion, not designed to be limited to net realized capital losses, 
for real estate tax shelters). 
49. General Uti!. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). 
50. I.R.C. §§ 311(b), 331 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
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transactions between partners and their partnerships. First, section 
707(b)(2) provides that when a sale of property occurs between a partner 
and the partner's controlled partnership, if the property is not a capital 
asset in the transferee's hands, then any gain recognized on the transac-
tion shall be considered ordinary income. 51 This provision now merely 
precludes eligibility of gains that might otherwise be capital gains for 
offset by capital losses. 
Second, section 724 provides that property contributed by a partner 
to a partnership will retain its character in the hands of the partnership. 52 
This provision applies to unrealized receivables, inventory, and capital 
assets that later produce losses. Presently, the only effect of the provision 
is to restrict the transferee partnership's creation of capital gain or ordi-
nary loss. This restriction reduces the amounts of income that may be 
offset by capital losses at the partnership or partner level. 
Third, section 735 controls the character of gain or loss on disposi-
tion of property that has been distributed by a partnership if the property 
was an unrealized receivable or an inventory item in the hands of the 
partnership. 53 The provision prevents conversion of such items into capi-
tal assets before their disposition and thus prevents offset by capital losses 
against gain on such disposition. 
Finally, section 751 provides that an amount received by a partner 
from sale or exchange of a partnership interest, to the extent attributable 
to unrealized receivables or to inventory items that have appreciated sub-
stantially in value (called "hot assets"), is considered an amount realized 
from the sale of property that is not a capital asset. 54 Section 751 pro-
vides the same treatment when a distribution in kind to a partner results 
in that partner's receipt of either more or less than his pro rata share of 
the unrealized receivables or of the substantially appreciated inventory. 
In either event, the transaction is considered an exchange with the part-
nership for the disproportionate amount, and gain to the partner or part-
nership that disposes of a share in the hot assets is treated as ordinary 
income. This complex provision now serves only to limit the amount of 
capital gain eligible to be offset by capital loss from other sources. 
The risk of cherry-picking in conjunction with realized gains on col-
lapsible corporation stock or on transactions between partners and their 
partnerships is minimal. Certainly, the risk is not sufficient to justify 
retention of provisions as complex and difficult to administer as sections 
341 and 751. The American Law Institute's Federal Income Tax Project 
on Subchapter K had this to say about the complexity of section 7 51 (b): 
Section 751(b) is extraordinarily complex. It constructs hypo-
thetical exchanges of capital and non-capital assets in situations 
51. Id. § 707(b)(2). 
52. Id. § 724. 
53. Id. § 735. 
54. Id. § 751. 
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where an actual exchange has not occurred. This rule was criti-
cized as complex by the 1957 Advisory Group, which recom-
mended its repeal. That group analyzed § 751(b) before the 
category of unrealized receivables was greatly expanded by the 
addition of such pervasive items as § 1245 recapture, § 1250 
recapture, etc. As a result of that expansion, it is difficult to 
imagine a non-pro rata partnership distribution to which 
§ 751(b) does not apply. If the reports of noncompliance with 
§ 751(b) are correct, the continuance of such a provision must 
have an adverse bearing on taxpayer respect for the law.55 
VESTIGIAL SECTION 1231 
Section 1231 was designed to allow favorable capital gain tax rate 
treatment of net gains on sales of long-term business assets while retain-
ing ordinary loss treatment of net losses on such assets. First, a determi-
nation is made as to whether long-term gains from the sale or exchange 
of property used in the taxpayer's trade or business exceeded losses from 
these transactions. If gains from involuntary conversions exceed invol-
untary conversion losses, these gains and losses are included with the 
business asset gains and losses from sales and exchanges. If the gains 
exceed the losses, both gains and losses are treated as capital gains and 
losses. If the losses exceed the gains, both gains and losses are treated as 
ordinary income and losses. If section 1231 losses exceed section 1231 
gains, their treatment as ordinary gains and losses permits the net excess 
of losses to offset ordinary income from other sources. 
Section 1231 still functions to ameliorate the general restriction on 
the use of capital losses not directly covered by section 1231 by permit-
ting them to be used to offset net long-term gains on business assets. 
Thus, a taxpayer with net section 1231 gains can time realization of capi-
tal losses to offset the section 1231 gains. This cherry-picking has been 
possible since enactment of the 1939 Code predecessor to section 1231. 
The offset is more valuable now that long-term capital gains are taxed at 
ordinary income tax rates, but the principle remains unchanged. Allow-
ance of capital losses in full against ordinary income would not be more 
beneficial to taxpayers for transactions now covered by section 1231. 
Such allowance would, however, permit the entire section 1231 machin-
ery to be dismantled, simplifying the Code to that extent. 
ADDITIONAL CANDIDATES FOR SIMPLIFICATION 
A whole range of Code provisions exist merely to provide exceptions 
to the general definition of capital losses. None would be necessary if 
capital losses were allowed without restriction on the same basis as ordi-
55. American Law Institute, Proposals on the Taxation 0/ Partners, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K 51 (1982) (footnotes omitted). 
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nary losses. The following Code provisions could be eliminated or, in the 
case of section 1221, retained only for use in special situations: 
1. Section 165(g)(3) allows a parent corporation to treat loss on 
worthless stock and securities of a subsidiary as ordinary loss. 56 This 
provision would be unnecessary if capital losses were allowed in full, be-
cause the worthless stock losses would be allowed whether or not they 
were ordinary losses. 
2. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 584(c) classify as separate 
from ordinary income of common trust funds the short-term and long-
term gains and losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets of such 
funds for purposes of inclusion in the fund participants' taxable in-
come. 57 The distinction between "long-term" and "short-term" has no 
present function, and the separate classification of capital gains and 
losses assigned to the fund participants will have no function if capital 
losses are allowed in full. 
3. Section 631 provides that profits on the cutting of timber, dispo-
sal of timber with a retained interest in the underlying property, and 
disposal of coal and iron ore in return for royalties are to be treated as 
sales or exchanges. 58 The effect of "sale or exchange" characterization is 
to treat the amounts received as gain on the sale or exchange of section 
1231 assets. Taxation of capital gains at the same rates as ordinary in-
come has eliminated the tax rate advantage that formerly inured from 
classification of timber, coal, and iron ore income as income derived from 
section 1231 asset sales. The only residual effect of section 631 is to in-
clude this income in the section 1231 mix and thus to expand somewhat 
the amount of income that is eligible to be offset by capital losses from 
other sources. If capital losses are allowed in full, section 631 will have 
no effect and can be eliminated. 
4. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 702(a) require that each part-
ner take into account separately his partnership share of short-term and 
long-term capital gains and losses. 59 The distinction between short and 
long-term no longer has any consequence and separate accounting for 
capital assets may be discontinued entirely if capital losses are allowed in 
full. 
5. Section 818(b )(2) contains a rule for applying section 1221 (2) to 
an insurance company.60 In effect, the rule is that depreciable property 
or real property used in a trade or business shall be considered a capital 
asset if the trade or business is not the insurance business. The provision 
now has no direct consequences with respect to capital gains. The effect, 
however, is to treat gains on business assets used in a non-insurance busi-
ness as eligible for offset by capital losses and to treat losses on assets 
56. 1.R.c. § 165(g)(3) (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
57. [d. § 584(c). 
58. [d. § 631. 
59. [d. § 702(a)(I), (2). 
60. [d. § 818(b)(2). 
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used in a non-insurance business as capital losses that may not be used to 
offset ordinary income. 
6. Section 1221 defines the term "capital asset."61 If capital losses 
are allowed in full, this definition will be unnecessary except to exempt 
gain on certain capital assets by non-resident aliens62 and possibly to re-
tain the special treatment of charitable contributions of capital gain 
property. 63 
There are provisions in the Code that contain cross-references to all 
or parts of the capital asset.definition.64 Ifsection 1221 is repealed, these 
provisions can be served just as well by a definition in section 7701 that 
will embody the present language of paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 
1221. 
7. Paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of section 1222 contain the defi-
nitions of long-term and short-term capital gains and capital losses.6s 
The distinction between "long-term" and "short-term" no longer has any 
tax consequences either for capital gains or for capital losses. If capital 
losses are allowed in full, all four paragraphs can be eliminated. 
8. Section 1223 contains rules governing determination of the 
holding period of property for purposes of distinguishing short-term 
from long-term gains and losses.66 As with the definitions of short-term 
and long-term gains and losses in section 1222, these holding period rules 
can be el~minated with respect to capital assets. If capital losses are al-
lowed in full, permitting elimination of section 1231, such rules can be 
eliminated altogether. 
9. Section 1233 treats gains and losses from short sales as gains 
and losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets in some circum-
stances.67 Section 1233(b) treats certain losses as long-term capital 
losses. If capital losses are allowed in full against ordinary income, sec-
tion 1233 can be eliminated. 
10. Section 1234 characterizes gain or loss from options as either 
ordinary or capital gain or loss, depending on the character of the op-
tioned property.68 Loss from failure to exercise an option is treated as 
loss from a sale or exchange, which has the effect of characterizing the 
loss as capital loss if the underlying asset is a capital asset. If the under-
lying asset is a section 1231 asset, however, the loss might be treated as 
61. Id. § 1221. 
62. Id. § 871(a). 
63. Id. § 17O(b)(1)(C). 
64. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 56(a)(6)(A), 170(e)(3)(A) (1982 & West Supp. 1988), §§ 263A(b) 
(2)(A), 267(f)(3)(B)(i), (iii), 367(a)(3)(B)(i) (1988), §§ 856(c)(2)(D), 857(b)(4)(B)(i) 
(1982 & West Supp. 1988), §§ 864(d)(3)(A), 865(h)(I) (1988), §§ 995(b)(1)(C), 
10 17(b)(3)(E)(i), 1092(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (1982 & West Supp. 1988), § 1362(d) 
(3)(D)(ii) (1988). 
65. I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4) (1982 & West Supp. 1988) . 
. 66. Id. § 1223. 
67. Id. § 1233. 
68. Id. § 1234. 
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ordinary loss. Section 1234 will be unnecessary if capital losses are al-
lowed in full. 
11. Section 1234A provides for capital gain or loss treatment of 
gain or loss from cancellation or lapse of a right or obligation with re-
spect to personal property that is actively traded, such as commodities, 
and with respect to a futures contract of the type that is marked to mar-
ket under section 1256.69 This provision can be eliminated if capital 
losses are allowed in full, because the capital asset characterization no 
longer will have any consequences. 
12. Section 1235 provides that a transfer of patent rights is to be 
treated as the sale or exchange of a long-term capital asset.70 Treatment 
of the rights as having been held long-term now has no consequences. 
The capital asset characterization also will have no consequences if capi-
tal losses are allowed in full. 
13. Section 1236 contains a special rule permitting dealers in se-
curities to hold securities as capital assets in certain circumstances.71 
The provision will be meaningless if capital losses are allowed in full. 
14. Section 1237 provides a semi-mechanical rule for determining 
when real property that is subdivided for sale is held primarily for sale to 
customers and when it is held as a capital asset.72 The distinction no 
longer will be relevant if capital losses are allowed in full. 
15. Section 1239 provides that gain on the sale of depreciable 
property between related taxpayers shall be treated as ordinary income. 73 
The only current effect of the provision is to preclude use of capital losses 
to offset the ordinary gain. The provision will have no effect if capital 
losses are allowed in full. 
16. Allowance of capital losses in full will make three provisions 
concerning small businesses unnecessary. Section 1242 provides for 
treatment of loss on stock in a small business investment company as 
ordinary 10ss.74 Section 1243 also provides for ordinary loss treatment of 
loss on stock received pursuant to a conversion privilege of convertible 
debentures under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958.75 Finally, 
section 1244 provides that, within certain limits, losses by the initial own-
ers of stock of a small business company shall also be treated as ordinary 
10ss.76 
17. Sections 1245 and 1250 characterize a portion of gain on dis-
position of depreciated assets as ordinary income, thereby limiting the 
69. [d. § 1234A. 
70. [d. § 1235. 
71. [d. § 1236. 
72. [d. § 1237. 
73. [d. § 1239. 
74. [d. § 1242. 
75. Pub. L. No. 85-699,72 Stat. 689 (1988)(corlified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-697b (1976 & 
West Supp. 1988». 
76. I.R.C. § 1244 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). 
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amount of gain eligible to be offset by capital losses from other sources.77 
If capital losses are allowed in full, this function of sections 1245 and 
1250 will disappear. 
18. Section 1247(a) provides that if foreign investment companies 
elect to distribute income currently, net capital gain of these companies is 
determined and passed through to qualified investors.78 The only conse-
quence now is to enable shareholders to offset capital losses against the 
net capital gain passed through to such shareholders. The provision can 
be eliminated if capital losses are allowed in full. 
19. Section 1271 deems amounts received on retirement of debt 
instruments as amounts received in exchange for such instruments.79 
The effect is to qualify these transactions for capital gain or loss treat-
ment. The provision can be deleted if all distinctions in treatment be-
tween capital assets and other assets are removed. 
CONCLUSION 
TRA '86 improved horizontal equity by taxing capital gains at the 
same rates as other income, and it simplified day-to-day application of 
the capital gain and loss provisions for most individual taxpayers. The 
Code is still burdened, however, by capital gain and loss distinctions that 
still affect individual taxpayers who have substantial capital losses and 
corporations incurring any net capital losses. 
The policy considerations behind retention of such distinctions jus-
tify neither this unfairness toward taxpayers with net capital losses nor 
the resulting complexity. Virtually all of the complications can be eradi-
cated if Congress is willing to take the additional step of allowing capital 
losses in full in the same manner that ordinary losses are now treated. 
77. Id. §§ 1245, 1250. 
78. Id. § 1247(a). 
79. Id. § 1271. 
